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 1
The Curious Case of ‘Schools’ of IR: From the Sociology to the Geopolitics of 
Knowledge 
 
Introduction 
 
Critical examinations of the global state of the disciplinary International Relations 
(IR) have long pointed to its peculiar geographical asymmetries: A dominant 
American ‘core’ produces most of the theories, if not always methodologies and 
epistemologies, that are then widely disseminated and consumed around the globe. In 
sharp contrast, IR theoretical knowledge produced at its putative peripheries and 
semi-peripheries rarely travels to this presumptive heartland of the discipline.
1
 These 
geopolitical core-periphery patterns in the disciplinary knowledge production have 
recently been subject to numerous critical empirical analyses, most of which confirm 
the asymmetric nature of the field.
2
 Recent calls for reimagining IR as a truly global 
discipline are clearly informed by an intellectual discontent with this disciplinary 
status quo.
3
 
Less attention, however, has been paid to an equally curious asymmetry in the 
use of disciplinary terminologies to label theoretical outputs produced in different 
corners of the globe. Theoretical output from the United States is usually known 
simply as ‘theories’ or ‘isms’ (realism, liberalism, constructivism, for example), 
which are rarely prefixed with ‘American’, perhaps due to their allegedly self-evident 
claim of universality. Meanwhile, it is increasingly common to use ‘school’ to refer to 
most non-American attempts at IR theoretical knowledge production.
4
 Further, most 
                                                        
1
 Stanley Hoffmann, ‘An American Social Science: International Relations’, Daedalus, Vol. 106, No. 3, 
1977, pp. 41–60; Kalevi Holsti, The Dividing Discipline (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985); Ole Wæver, 
‘The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline’, International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, 1998, 
pp. 687–727; Arlene Tickner and Ole Wæver, International Relations Scholarship Around the World 
(London: Routledge, 2009).  
2
 Jonas Hagmann and Thomas Biersteker, ‘Beyond the Published Discipline’, European Journal of 
International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2014, pp. 291–315; Peter Marcus Kristensen, ‘Revisiting the 
“American Social Science”’, International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2015, pp. 246–269; 
Wiebke Wemheuer-Vogelaar, Nicholas Bell, Mariana Morales, Michael Tierney, ’The IR of the 
Beholder,’ International Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2016, pp. 16–32. 
3
 Amitav Acharya, ‘Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds’, International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 4, 2014, pp. 647–659; Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, ‘Why Is There no 
Non-Western International Relations Theory? Ten Years On’, International Relations of the Asia-
Pacific, 2017. doi: 10.1093/irap/lcx006; Arlene Tickner, ‘Core, Periphery and (neo)imperialist 
International Relations, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2013, pp. 627–
646. 
4
 The only exception that we know of is a note in a conference paper by Ole Wæver, ’Aberystwyth, 
Paris, Copenhagen - New 'Schools' in Security Theory and their Origins between Core and Periphery’, 
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 2
recognized non-American ‘schools’ are prefixed by a geographical signifier that 
indicates their origins, boundedness, and particularity. Most notable is the ‘English 
School’, but there is also some talk of a ‘French’, ‘Italian’, ‘Russian’ and ‘Australian 
School’.
5
 Other notable examples, labeled for the city or institution of origin, include 
the Copenhagen, Paris, and Aberystwyth Schools in critical security studies and the 
Tsinghua School.
6
  
More recently, the attempted formation of a number of national schools beyond 
the ‘West’ have attracted considerable scholarly attention from their advocates and 
detractors alike, including in the pages of this journal.
7
 The intellectual pursuit of a 
‘Chinese School’, ‘Korean School’, ‘Japanese School’, ‘Indian School’ and 
‘Brazilian School’, among others, demonstrate that the search for national schools 
beyond the West is extensive and in earnest.
8
 As Phillip Darby notes, ‘the 
proliferation of schools and schools-in-the-making is now extending through much of 
the formerly colonized world. There is a case to be made for an Indian IR, a Korean 
                                                                                                                                                              
presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, March 17-20, 2004, 
pp. 12-13, but deleted in the published version of the paper. Wæver, ‘Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: 
The Europeanness of new “schools” of security theory in an American field’, in Arlene Tickner and 
David Blaney, eds., Thinking the International Differently (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 48–70. 
5
 Roy Jones, ‘The English School of International Relations,’ Review of International Studies, Vol. 7, 
No. 1, 1981, pp. 1–13; Jérémie Cornut and Dario Battistella, ‘Is French IR emerging?,’ Revue 
Française de Science Politique, Vol. 63, No. 2, 2013, pp. 97–128; Jörg Friedrichs, European 
Approaches to International Relations Theory (London: Routledge, 2004); Stephen Gill, 
'Epistemology, Ontology and the 'Italian School',' in Stephen Gill, ed., Gramsci, Historical 
Materialism and International Relations (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), pp. 21-48; Marina Lebedeva, 
‘International Relations Studies in the USSR/Russia: Is there a Russian National School of IR 
Studies?,’ Global Society, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2004, pp. 263–278; James Cotton, The Australian School of 
International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013), pp. 237–251. 
6
 Wæver, ‘Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: The Europeanness'; Xu Jin and Sun Xuefeng, ‘The 
Tsinghua Approach and the future direction of Chinese International Relations research’, Global 
Review, 6, 2014, pp. 18-32. 
7
 Amitav Acharya, ‘Dialogue and Discovery: In Search of International Relations Theories Beyond the 
West,’ Millennium, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2011, p. 626; Ching-Chang Chen, ‘The Absence of non-Western IR 
Theory in Asia Reconsidered,’ International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2011, pp. 1–
23; Wang Jiangli and Barry Buzan, ‘The English and Chinese Schools of International Relations: 
Comparisons and Lessons,’ Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2014, pp. 1–46; 
Linsay Cunningham-Cross and William Callahan, ‘Ancient Chinese Power, Modern Chinese Thought,’ 
Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2011, pp. 349–374; Hun Joon Kim, ‘Will IR 
Theory with Chinese Characteristics be a Powerful Alternative?,’ Chinese Journal of International 
Politics, 2016, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 59-79. 
8
 Takashi Inoguchi, ‘Japan, Korea and Taiwan: Are one hundred flowers about to blossom?,’ in Arlene 
Tickner and Ole Wæver, eds., International Relations Scholarship Around the World (London: 
Routledge, 2009), pp. 86–102; Peter Marcus Kristensen, Rising Powers in the International Relations 
Discipline (Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen Press, 2015); Zhang and Chang, Constructing a 
Chinese School of International Relations; Yan Xuetong et al, Ancient Chinese thought, modern 
Chinese power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Young Chul Cho, ‘Colonialism and 
Imperialism in the Quest for a Universalist Korean-style International Relations Theory,’ Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2015, pp. 680–700; Jong Kun Choi, ‘Theorizing East 
Asian International Relations in Korea,’ Asian Perspective, Vol. 32, No. 1, 2008, pp. 193–216. 
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 3
IR or a non-Western IR to redress the Eurocentrism that engulfed the discipline early 
in the 20th century.’
9
  As numerous non-American schools are in the making, one 
remains hard pressed to mention any theoretical endeavor in the American heartland 
of the discipline that is also labeled as a ‘geographical school’. 
This puzzling asymmetry in labeling theoretical knowledge production has thus 
far escaped serious attention in the discipline. Despite the fact that geographical and 
institutional labels have been increasingly commonly used to describe non-American 
approaches to theorizing IR, no IR study has focused exclusively on how schools 
form and function, what they do to the discipline, and why and how school labelling 
matters politically and intellectually.
10
 This paper aims to fill that gap. It examines the 
curious school phenomenon as both a mode of describing the global state of the 
discipline and as an expression of the aspiration of marginalized voices and 
communities outside the American core to advance their knowledge claims. The 
paper has two principal purposes: one is to investigate the sociological factors driving 
and sustaining school formation in IR; and the other is to critically assesses the 
political effects of such labeling for the discipline. 
The paper is organized into three main parts. We start, in the first section, with 
a consideration of how the question of geo-epistemic diversity has been articulated in 
the historical evolution of the discipline of IR, paying particular tribute to E. H. Carr 
for his pioneering efforts for initiating the ‘sociology of IR’. Drawing broadly on 
research in the sociology of knowledge, the second section discusses the sociological 
dynamics driving and sustaining the formation of intellectual schools of thought. As 
we outline a sociological explanation of IR schools, we analyze schools of thought as 
self-conscious, intellectually distinct, socially recognized and institutionalized 
collective endeavors at knowledge production. We exemplify these in the cases of the 
English, Chinese, the Copenhagen and other geographically labeled schools of 
thought in IR. Finally, in the third main section, we move beyond labeling 
phenomenon and discuss the contentious geopolitics of knowledge associated with 
the strategic use of school labeling by both its opponents and proponents. We 
consider what school labeling tells us about the close linkage between the political 
                                                        
9
 Phillip Darby, ‘Engaging with Asia: Three lives,’ Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 50, 
No. 1, 2015, pp. 209–210.  
10
 It should be noted that IR is not unique in labelling its schools geographically and institutionally. 
Other fields do this too, as we will discuss below. 
Page 3 of 33
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cjip
The Chinese Journal of International Politics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 4
and the epistemic in its different incarnations in our collective endeavor at knowledge 
production in the discipline of IR.  
 
Geo-epistemic Diversity in International Relations 
 
It is fairly common among IR scholars, and not only sociologists of the discipline, to 
argue that IR is done quite differently around the world.
11
 Although it seems almost 
oxymoronic to have national International Relations, scholars routinely point to a 
general geographical split between ‘American IR’, which tends to be rationalist and 
positivist, and ‘European IR’, which is generally more reflectivist and post-
positivist.
12
 Although it is hard to say whether IR is and has been more attentive to 
national variations than other disciplines, the concern with geopolitical and 
geocultural variations in the way that IR is done can be traced back to the 
historiography of the disciplinary growth. The initial interest in national variations 
was clearly based on a notion of disciplinary exceptionalism. That is to say that the 
interest in different national perspectives on IR was related to the implied raison 
d’etre of IR: to improve mutual understanding among states. The very interest in 
different national perspectives on IR involves a departure from the assumption that 
science is universal and a move into the sociology of knowledge. The first and more 
explicit engagement with the sociology of knowledge is seen in E. H. Carr’s 
engagement with Karl Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge in The Twenty Years’ 
Crisis (1939).
13
  
 
E. H. Carr and National Variations of IR Knowledge Production 
 
In The Twenty Years’ Crisis, E. H. Carr offered a proto-sociology for understanding 
the geopolitics of knowledge production in IR.  Drawing on Karl Mannheim’s 
                                                        
11
 Tickner and Wæver, International Relations Scholarship Around the World. 
12
 Wæver, ‘The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline'; Ole Wæver, ‘Aberystwyth, Paris, 
Copenhagen: The Europeanness'; Steve Smith, ‘The Discipline of International Relations: Still an 
American Social Science?,’ British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2000, 
pp. 374–402; Daniel Levine and Alexander Barder, ‘The closing of the American mind: “American 
School” International Relations and the State of Grand Theory,’ European Journal of International 
Relations, Vol. 20, No. 4, 2014, pp. 863–888. 
13  E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939 (New York: Harper Perennial, 1939); For an 
excellent reading of Mannheim’s influence on Carr, see Charles Jones, ‘Carr, Mannheim, and a Post–
positivist Science of International Relations,’ Political Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2, 1997, pp. 232–246. 
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 5
sociology of knowledge, Carr directly stressed the social embeddedness and relativity 
of knowledge, particularly in his claim that ‘Haves’ thinks IR differently from ‘Have-
nots’.
 
The socio-historical position and political-material interests of the knower, he 
argued, determine IR knowledge. This is particularly true if the knower is part of the 
dominant-but-declining strata, which defends the antiquated status quo order vis-à-vis 
the ‘oppressed-but-rising’ strata, which attack that order.
14
 The situatedness of 
theories of international relations in terms of the dichotomy of ‘haves’ vis-à-vis 
‘have-nots’ was evident to Carr when he criticized the status quo bias of idealist 
theories of international relations in the inter-war years, which, he claimed, 
‘emanated almost exclusively from the English-speaking countries. British and 
American writers continued to assume that the uselessness of war had been 
irrefutably demonstrated by the experience of 1914-1918, and that an intellectual 
grasp of this fact was all that was necessary to induce the nations to keep the peace in 
the future’.
15
  
For Carr, Anglo-Saxon theories of international relations are invariably ‘the 
product of dominant nations or groups of nations’ and indeed a ‘convenient weapon 
for belaboring those who assail the status quo’.
16
 Theories are neither universal nor 
disinterested in Carr’s view. They are always connected to the identity, interest and 
power of their originators. One of the notable achievements of Realism, according to 
Carr, is ‘to demonstrate that intellectual theories and ethical standards of utopianism, 
far from being the absolute and a priori principles, are historically conditioned, being 
both products of circumstances and interests and weapons framed for the furtherance 
of interests’.
17
 Carr thus posits Realism as a sociology of knowledge, well aware that 
Realism itself ‘is as much socially conditioned, and just as much the reflection of 
particular interests, as utopianism’.
18
 
The question of the social embeddedness and relativity of knowledge depending 
on variations in national/geopolitical/geocultural context continued to be explored 
persistently in the subsequent decades of scholarship. This is especially true in terms 
of the differences between the dominant American IR, on the one hand, and British 
and continental European IR on the other, which has been debated at length at least 
                                                        
14
 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1954 [1929]), p. 236. 
15
 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939, p. 67. 
16 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939, p. 187. 
17
 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939, p. 87. 
18
 Jones, ‘Carr, Mannheim, and a Post–positivist Science of International Relations,’ p. 238. 
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 6
since the 1950s.
19
 Stanley Hoffmann’s claim that IR as an American social science 
and Ole Wæver’s critique of IR as ‘a not so international discipline’ are two prime 
examples. In the last ten years or so, a more systematic comparative sociology of 
science, or ‘IR around the world’ literature, has explored different national and 
geocultural perspectives on the international, focusing more recently on ‘non-Western’ 
IR.
20
 Such a comparative sociological approach to making inquiries into knowledge 
production is often motivated by its seeming relativity, notably its geographical 
relativity along the Pascalian notion that ‘what is truth on the one side of the Pyrenees 
is error on the other’.
21
 This comparative approach is further enhanced and 
complemented by the post-colonial critique of the geopolitics of knowledge, which 
sees colonialism as laying the groundwork for organizing knowledge around the 
colonial and the imperial differences; and geographies of knowledge of world politics, 
which interrogate where knowledge is produced and how it circulates.
22
 Both take us 
back to the more general question of the problematic relationship between knowledge 
and power in IR. 
 
Knowledge and Power: The Tragedy of Great Power Theorizing 
 
To the extent that the sociology of IR has given us a variety of frameworks for 
analyzing the factors that make IR different in different countries, most interventions 
have been concerned with the extent to which the distinctiveness of the discipline 
(capitalized IR) in a given country is related to its foreign policy stance, broader 
                                                        
19  Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, ‘L’étude des Relations Internationales’, Revue Française de Science 
Politique, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1952, pp. 676–701; Alfred Grosser, ‘L’étude des Relations Internationales, 
Spécialité Américaine?’, Revue Française de Science Politique, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1956, pp. 634–651; 
Holsti, The dividing discipline; Wæver, ‘The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline’; Smith, 
‘The discipline of international relations: still an American social science?’; Steve Smith, ‘The United 
States and the Discipline of International Relations: “Hegemonic Country, Hegemonic Discipline”’, 
International Studies Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2002, pp. 67–86; Robert Crawford and Darryl Jarvis, 
International Relations: Still an American Social Science? (Albany: SUNY Press, 2001); Friedrichs, 
European Approaches to International Relations Theory; Knud Erik Jørgensen and Tonny Brems 
Knudsen, International Relations in Europe, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006). 
20
 For some overviews, see Tickner and Wæver, International Relations Scholarship Around the 
World; Acharya and Buzan, eds., Non-Western International Relations Theory; Robbie Shilliam, 
International Relations and Non-Western Thought (London: Routledge, 2010); Chen, ‘The absence of 
non-western IR theory in Asia reconsidered’; Tickner and Blaney, Thinking the International 
Differently. 
21
 Steve Woolgar, Science: The Very Idea (Chichester: Ellis Horwood, 1988), p. 22. 
22 John Agnew, ‘Know-Where: Geographies of Knowledge of World Politics,’ International Political 
Sociology, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2007, pp. 138–148; Walter Mignolo, ‘The Geopolitics of Knowledge and the 
Colonial Difference,’ The South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 101, No. 1, 2002, pp. 57–96. 
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 7
geopolitical position and current events in world politics (i.r.). Not surprisingly, the 
relationship between IR and i.r.—and the related debate between what may be called 
the internalist and the externalist accounts—has become the main point of contention 
in the sociology of IR.
23
 The beginning of a sociology of IR as a research program in 
this manner arguably starts with Stanley Hoffmann. In his now canonical essay 
International Relations: An American Social Science, Hoffmann was explicit about 
national embeddedness of IR in the United States and how it related to its growing 
power status: ‘The growth of the discipline cannot be separated from the American 
role in world affairs after 1945’, he contends, in particular, ‘the rise of the United 
States to world power’.
24
 America’s preponderance of power enabled it to mold world 
politics and required a theoretical justification for doing so. Two other contextual 
variables facilitated the development of a discipline: namely the institutional 
opportunities between American politics and academia and the intellectual 
predisposition towards applied Enlightenment. 
Hoffmann clearly shares with Carr a focus on the social embeddedness and 
national relativity of knowledge that runs through much of the later sociology of IR 
literature. Moreover, these early interventions share a concern with the intimate 
relationship between the locus of power and the production of knowledge in IR. 
Where Carr focuses on the difference in the IR perspectives of Haves and Have-nots, 
Hoffmann sees a divide between IR in the powerful, of which there is plenty, and the 
lack of IR as seen from the weak: ‘the political preeminence of the United States is 
the factor I would stress most in explaining why the discipline has fared so badly, by 
comparison, in the rest of the world’.
25
 The power-centered understanding of the 
production and circulation of knowledge in IR therefore persists from Carr to 
Hoffmann. Such an intimate relationship between power and knowledge is restated in 
more blunt terms by Ken Booth almost two decades later in his claim that ‘the 
institutionalization of the subject [of IR] and its development underlines simply and 
clearly the crucial relationship between the global distribution of power and global 
production of knowledge’ and by Steve Smith when he argues that ‘truth and 
knowledge are functions of power’ and that ‘the discipline [of IR] reflects U.S. 
                                                        
23
 Wæver, ‘The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline'; Brian C. Schmidt, ‘On the History and 
Historiography of International Relations,’ in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, 
eds., Handbook of international relations (London: Sage, 2002), pp. 3–22. 
24
 Hoffmann, ‘An American Social Science,’ pp. 43-49. 
25
 Hoffmann, ‘An American Social Science,’ pp. 43, 48. 
Page 7 of 33
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cjip
The Chinese Journal of International Politics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 8
political, economic and cultural hegemony.’
26
 It also finds a distinct echo in recent 
studies in critical geopolitics where the uneven distribution of global power is seen to 
have imposed a common “script” of world politics more in some places than in 
others.
27
 
The claims and critiques that the powerful in i.r. also dominate IR knowledge 
production have contributed, perhaps unwittingly, to a growing focus on scholarly 
efforts at IR theorizing in those countries that are becoming increasingly powerful in 
i.r.. The so-called ‘emerging’ or ‘rising’ powers, that is. These types of rising-power-
produce-IR explanations are still in vogue when explaining recent attempts to 
construct national schools of IR beyond the West. The entrenched assumptions that 
IR theories tend to be produced by great powers are evident, for example, when 
Amitav Acharya claims that ‘Changes to the global distribution of ideas will 
increasingly accompany changes to the global distribution of power’ and when he 
asks ‘whether the development of distinctive schools of IR theories are the exclusive 
preserve of great powers, for example China, Japan, India and so on’ and accepts that 
‘This of course would be hardly unusual given the historically close nexus between 
power (Britain, Europe and the USA) and the production of IR knowledge.’
28
  
The expectation that IR theoretical alternatives will come out of rising powers 
has probably most clearly articulated in China. It has prompted Chinese scholars to 
ask ‘will China’s rise bring the rise of Chinese IR theory?’,
29
 and to claim that ‘A 
Chinese IRT is likely and even inevitable to emerge along with the great economic 
and social transformation that China has been experiencing and by exploring the 
essence of the Chinese intellectual tradition’.
30
 Not only has China’s changing role in 
the international system provided valuable opportunities for Chinese scholars to 
theorize IR, but the construction of IR theories with Chinese characteristics has also 
                                                        
26  Ken Booth, ‘75 Years On: Rewriting the Subject’s Past-Reinventing Its Future,’ in Ken Booth, 
Steve Smith, and Marysia Zalewski, eds., International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 331; Smith, ‘The United States and the Discipline of 
International Relations', p. 69; Smith, ‘The discipline of international relations’, p. 394. 
27  John Agnew ‘Emerging China and Critical Geopolitics: Between World Politics and Chinese 
Particularity’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2010, 51, No. 5, pp. 569–582. 
28
 Acharya, ‘Dialogue and Discovery,’ p. 625; Acharya, ‘Global International Relations (IR) and 
Regional Worlds,’ p. 656. 
29 Wang Yiwei, ‘China: Between copying and constructing,’ in Arlene Tickner and Ole Wæver, eds., 
International Relations Scholarship Around the World (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 114. 
30
 Qin Yaqing, ‘Why is there no Chinese international relations theory?,’ International Relations of the 
Asia-Pacific, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2007, p. 313. For a more recent assertion that constructing a Chinese 
School of IR is not only desirable, but also inevitable, see Ren Xiao, ‘The “Chinese School” debate: 
personal reflections,’ in Zhang and Chang, eds., Constructing a Chinese School of International 
Relations, pp. 35–51.  
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 9
become a necessary preparation for the essential trappings of China’s rise as a global 
power.
31
 The ongoing debates on the construction of a ‘Chinese School’ of IR 
continues to grapple with the question of the ‘Chinese consciousness’ and ‘the 
Chinese sensibilities’ in theoretical innovation as China rises.
32
  
Such ‘great power theorizing’ is tragic in at least three senses. First, power 
political explanations are invariably reductionist, despite their apparent 
persuasiveness—i.e. that a rising China needs IR theory like America did and that the 
intimate relationship between the locus of national power and national production of 
knowledge can be historically traced back in the IR disciplinary development. An 
exclusive focus on the great power politics of theorizing leaves us with a very crude 
power-based sociology of knowledge, where knowledge is often reducible to national 
power. IR theory then becomes a state identity project, where knowledge always only 
serves power, i.e. 20
th
 century American IR serving the United States rise to global 
power, the English School as a way of managing imperial decline, the Chinese School 
as an attempt to legitimize Chinese hegemony in East Asia and beyond, and so on. 
We miss all the other factors that influence theorizing as well as the differences 
within China or the United States. Second, power political readings of knowledge 
production assume an unproblematic relationship between power and knowledge in 
IR theorizing. They lead inescapably to limited understanding of what IR is and to a 
parochial vision of what IR theories can be. And when it comes to explaining 
‘schools of thought’, power political readings are problematic, even absurd, in such 
cases as the Copenhagen school (a theory for the security policy of the city of 
Copenhagen?). Third and finally, it raises more questions about, than provide answers 
to, the geopolitics of knowledge production and geographies of knowledge and power. 
 
The Sociology of IR as Geography of Knowledge  
 
                                                        
31
 Li Wei and Tang Jian, ‘China’s Changing Role on the International Stage and Opportunities for 
Chinese Scholars’ Theoretical Innovation’, The Journal of International Studies, No. 4, 2014, pp. 40-
58; Yang Jiemian, ‘Preparing for China to Become a Global Power: Constructing Chinese 
International Theory’, World Politics and Economic, No. 8, pp. 149-155. 
32
 Qin Yaqing, ‘Constructing a Chinese School of International Relations Theory’, People’s Daily, 15 
February 2016; Guo Shuyong, ‘The Growth of the Chinese Consciousness in the Development of 
Chinese International Theory and the Prospect of a Chinese School of IR’, International Review, No. 1, 
2017, pp. 19-39. See also Yan Xuetong, ‘An International Relations Theory of Moral Realism’, 
International Studies, No. 5, 2014, pp. 102-128. 
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Recent sociological inquiries into the IR disciplinary and theoretical development 
started to challenge these externalist explanations by arguing that the causal 
connection between i.r. events and IR theorizing is often vague and it is mostly 
assumed rather than demonstrated.
33
 The most influential is probably the attempt 
made by Ole Wæver to construct a non-reductionist framework, which turns 
Hoffmann’s three variables mentioned earlier into a more elaborate threefold 
typology of factors to explain why IR has been done differently in different places. 
These are, namely, Society and polity (comprising cultural/intellectual styles, 
‘ideologies’ or traditions of political thought, form of state and state–society relations, 
foreign policy), Social sciences (comprising general conditions and definitions of 
social science and disciplinary patterning), and Intellectual activities in 
IR(comprising social and intellectual structure of the discipline and theoretical 
traditions).
34
 Waever’s three-fold typology, wittingly or not, has further reinforced the 
claim of the geo-epistemic diversity of the discipline in its contemporary 
manifestation. This threefold typology has been supplemented in later studies by 
variables like domestic political culture and institutions.
35
 Through a wealth of case 
studies, we now know that IR is ‘quite different in different places’ around the 
world,
36
 depending on variations in an increasing number of variables. The 
development of scientific knowledge of IR, to borrow from Richard Whitley, is 
‘sociologically problematic’.
37
 
 This assertion of the sociologically problematic nature of IR knowledge 
production is complemented and further sustained by the intervention of the 
geography of knowledge literature, which challenges the idea of a universalist 
epistemology and advances the concept of geo-epistemology grounded in the 
argument that ‘knowledge and processes of knowledge production are not 
independent from space and time, but contingent upon respective places (in a narrow, 
                                                        
33
 Wæver, ‘The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline'; Schmidt, ‘On the History and 
Historiography of International Relations’. 
34
 Wæver, ‘The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline’. 
35 Henrik Ø. Breitenbauch and Anders Wivel, ‘Understanding National IR Disciplines Outside the 
United States: Political Culture and the Construction of International Relations in Denmark,’ Journal 
of International Relations and Development, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2004, pp. 414–443; Jørgensen and Knudsen, 
International Relations in Europe. 
36 Wæver, ‘The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline’, p. 723. 
37
 Richard Whitley, The Intellectual and Social Organization of the Sciences, 2
nd
 edition (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), p. ix.  
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geographical sense), histories, and identities.’
38
 Knowledge production is, in other 
words, geographically (of both spatial and temporal dimensions) relational. Critical 
awareness of geopolitics of knowledge, i.e. knowing where knowledge is produced 
(i.e. the social-geographical sources of knowledge), and how it is ordered and 
circulated in world politics, argues John Agnew, is crucial in guarding against ‘the 
interpretive projections from the knowledge experiences of specific places/times onto 
all places/times’ and against ‘privileg[ing] a singular history of knowledge associated 
with a specific world region or of conceptions of knowledge that implicitly or 
explicitly presume their self-evident universality’.
39
 Colonialism and global 
hegemony, Agnew further asserts, are two powerful political conditioning factors 
under which knowledge of world politics is produced and circulates.
40
  
If we accept that IR knowledge production is sociologically problematic and 
that geo-epistemic variations need to be taken seriously, the question remains: Does 
this imply that every country—perhaps even city, institution and individual—has its 
own distinctive IR school of thought based on its particular society-polity, academic 
institutions, styles, disciplinary delineations and historical trajectories? Surely not, as 
this would imply that we have as many schools as we have scholars. Distinctive 
geographically labeled schools of thought, we argue, are always a product of more 
than their different geographical-cultural-historical locations. We need a more 
elaborate vocabulary for thinking about ‘schools of thought’—as opposed to the ‘geo-
epistemic diversity’ treated in the above—and a more nuanced sociological scheme to 
explain their formation. 
 
School of Thought: Towards a Sociological Explanation of School Formation 
How can we explain sociologically the curious case of schools of thought in IR? 
Drawing on the sociology of science and the sociology of intellectual life, we have 
identified a number of social conditions and dynamics that foster the emergence of 
genuine and distinctive ‘schools of thought’ in IR. In what follows, four such 
dynamics and conditions are discussed as constituting an analytical scheme in 
explaining the formation of distinctive ‘schools’ of IR. They are, namely, (1) carving 
                                                        
38
 Wiebke Wemheuer-Vogelaar and Ingo Peters, ‘Introduction: Global (izing) International Relations: 
Studying Geo-epistemological Divides and Diversity’, in Peters and Wemheuer-Vogelaar (eds.) 
Globalizing International Relations: Scholarship Amidst Divides and Diversity (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2016), pp. 4-5. 
39
 Agnew, ‘Know-Where’, p. 138. 
40
 Agnew, ‘Know-Where’, p. 146. 
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out a distinctive intellectual position in relation to the status quo; (2) opposition-
recognition dynamics; (3) the formation of social and intellectual networks; and (4) 
control over an institutional infrastructure.  
Before proceeding, three caveats are in order. First, the presence and interplay 
of these dynamics, either individually or collectively, constitutes only some necessary 
conditions for the formation of school of thought. That is, we argue that it is hard for 
schools of thought to emerge if they do not have a distinct position relative to the 
status quo, are not subject to debate and opposition, are not embedded in a broader 
social-intellectual network, and do not have some support by a material-institutional 
infrastructure. That said, these are not sufficient explanations. Why and how a school 
of thought comes into being is also highly contingent in the first instance upon ideas 
and idea entrepreneurs.  
Second, in sociological terms, large-scale political and economic changes – 
such as those highlighted above – are also important to consider as ‘the outmost level 
of macro-causality’ because they may ‘indirectly set off periods of intellectual 
change’. Here we follow Randall Collins who argues in his sociology of intellectual 
change that the external world ‘does not so much directly determine the kinds of 
ideas created as give an impetus for stability or change in the organizations which 
support intellectual careers, and this moulds in turn the networks within them’.
41
 
Sociopolitical structures are thus awarded an indirect causal role in that they may 
shape the organizations supporting intellectual life, which again allow intellectuals to 
face inward at intellectual controversies within the academic field.
42
 However, the 
primary sociological drivers of intellectual change, and school of formation in 
particular, are at the micro-level of intellectual controversies, (op)position-taking, and 
networks. We therefore put a particular emphasis on the first two dynamics. 
Finally, we do not imply in our discussions below that the four dynamics must 
play out in the particular sequence in order for schools of thought to emerge. Their 
particular arrangement in the following rather serves to move from the two most 
micro and science-internal factors towards more socio-institutional factors at the 
meso-level. In practice, however, the process of carving out a distinctive intellectual 
position unfolds in the short term and is, logically, likely to occur prior to the 
opposition and recognition by critics. Similarly, we expect social network formation 
                                                        
41
 Collins, The Sociology of Philosophies, p. 51, 82. 
42
 Collins, The Sociology of Philosophies, p. 324.  
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to occur early on but also to expand over the long term, even for generations, while 
the consolidation of an institutional-material base, publication outlets and the like, is 
likely to unfold over the medium term.  
 
Distinctive Intellectual Position in Relation to the Status Quo  
 
The construction of new schools is a relational and oppositional process vis-à-vis the 
status quo. New schools are defined as much by what they are as by what they are 
not—in relation to opposing old schools in their field. New intellectual schools 
develop, in Randall Collins’ rendering, as innovation by opposition. The intellectual 
field, Collins argues in his theory of intellectual innovation, functions as a ‘structured 
rivalry’. In the competition for what he calls limited intellectual ‘attention space’, 
intellectuals ‘thrive on disagreement, dividing the attention space into three to six 
factions, seeking lines of creativity by negating the chief tenets of their rivals’.
43
 In 
order to be recognized as such, new schools of thought must therefore not only 
present different and innovative thinking but also position themselves in relation, and 
often in opposition, to important debates, positions and questions in the field. New 
schools will therefore have to be familiar with, draw on, and relate to the status quo 
knowledge (what Collins calls cultural capital) in order to find and exploit new 
openings in the attention space. In the words of Collins, ‘When there is “room” for a 
new position in the intellectual field, ambitious thinkers will search for those 
elements in the available corpus of materials that will maximally contradict the 
existing prominent positions.’
44
  
This type of innovative position-taking in relation to traditional positions in the 
field has important parallels to that explored in Bourdieusian sociologies of IR, 
although the problem is framed in terms of field and habitus rather than structure and 
agency. In this perspective, IR is seen as a field of relational position-takings where 
the objective position of academic agents within the field is both what enables and 
constrains their ‘space of possibilities’ (e.g. their strategies for putting forward new 
ideas or schools of thought). It is both a field of forces that imposes itself on agents 
and a battlefield or arena for the struggles playing out among them.
45
 The field 
                                                        
43 Collins, The Sociology of Philosophies, p. 876. 
44
 Collins, The Sociology of Philosophies, p. 134. 
45
 Gerard van der Ree, ’Saving the Discipline,’ International Political Sociology, Vol. 8, 2014, p. 219.  
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defines an agent’s position and thus delimits, in Hamati-Ataya’s words, ‘the possible 
strategies an agent has within a given configuration of the field to ‘play’ the game by 
investing his/her capital in it, through ‘position-takings’ that are necessarily relational, 
since they depend on an agent’s position with respect to others within a structured 
space.’
46
 As new peripheral schools seek to establish themselves, or even subvert 
existing hierarchies, she continues, it is necessary to engage and know the 
‘mainstream’ or ‘status quo’ positions in the field. Not in order to assimilate 
themselves into it, but, quite the contrary, to prevent assimilation and to realize their 
subversive and innovative potential.
47
 As van der Ree elaborates, any attempt to put 
forward new IR theories or schools will therefore always face a ’simultaneous need to 
overcome, as well as uphold, the status quo.’
48
 
An emerging school of thought must therefore never be so new that it is unclear 
how it contradicts ‘existing prominent positions’ and that it is not recognized as a 
contribution to the field. As Collins puts it, ‘ideas cannot be too new, whatever their 
creativeness [but] must also be important, that is, in relation to ongoing conversations 
of the intellectual community.’
49
 New schools of thought must, therefore, balance 
innovation and conformity to tradition or what Thomas Kuhn called ‘the essential 
tension’. This goes even for revolutionary scientific breakthroughs, according to 
Kuhn, as ‘only investigations firmly rooted in the contemporary scientific tradition 
are likely to break that tradition and give rise to a new one.’
50
 New schools are 
therefore expected to relate to existing ones and to emerge from scholars who are 
well versed and trained in the status quo. There is an element of constructive and 
strategic agency from new schools, as ‘the socially agreed upon boundaries of schools 
of thought influence how developers of new knowledge explicitly think about and 
position themselves within their field; thus, there is an explicit strategic dimension to 
knowledge positioning’.
51
 
Examples of these types strategic position-taking can also be found in the case 
of contending IR schools. The methodological positioning in the ‘Second Great 
Debate’ is a case in point. The strategic nature of position-taking is perhaps best 
                                                        
46
Inanna Hamati-Ataya,, ‘IR Theory as International Practice/Agency,’ Millennium, Vol. 40, 2012, p. 
631. 
47
 Hamati-Ataya, ‘IR Theory as International Practice/Agency, p. 645. 
48
 van der Ree, ’Saving the Discipline’, p. 220. 
49
 Collins, The Sociology of Philosophies, p. 31. 
50 Thomas Kuhn, The Essential Tension (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), p. 227. 
51
 S. Phineas Upham, Lori Rosenkopf, and Lyle Ungar, ‘Positioning Knowledge: Schools of Thought 
and New Knowledge Creation,’ Scientometrics, Vol. 83, No. 2, 2010, p. 556. 
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exemplified in Hedley Bull’s iconoclastic statement in ‘International Theory: A Case 
for Classical Approach’, where he positions the classical approach, characteristic of 
what emerged as the English School, in sharp opposition to the ‘American School of 
Scientific Politics’.
52
 This purposive widening of the Atlantic divide, which was 
further reinforced by Morton Kaplan’s framing of it into the ‘traditional’ vis-à-vis the 
‘scientific’ approach to theorizing IR, strengthened the collective identity of the 
emerging English School.
53
 Apart from the English School, however, most other 
geographical schools do not fit neatly into the great debates narrative. European 
security ‘schools’, Wæver maintains, have been successful despite not being 
interventions into American theoretical debate. Indeed, he proposes that the fact that 
they are not major competitors in the American ‘great debates’ is part of the reason 
why they are called ‘schools’.
54
 In terms of strategic positioning vis-à-vis the status 
quo, however, the Copenhagen School of securitization did initially make a similar 
move against the ‘traditional’: it was initially juxtaposed to ‘traditional’ security 
studies as it proposed a ‘new framework’ for studying non-traditional security threats. 
As critical security studies has now developed into a subfield of its own, however, the 
Copenhagen School itself has become the tradition against which new schools seek to 
position themselves. At a more general level, proponents of a Chinese School can be 
said to have strategically positioned it vis-à-vis the alleged Eurocentrism of the entire 
‘Western IR’ tradition with pretentiously universalist claims as represented by 
traditional Western IR theories, such as realism, liberalism and constructivism.  
The logic whereby new schools must relate to existing schools and debates is 
also evident in Richard Whitley’s argument that scientific fields ‘reward intellectual 
innovation—only new knowledge is publishable—and yet contributions have to 
conform to collective standards and priorities if they are to be regarded as competent 
and scientific’.
55  
By the same token, emerging schools must not only insert 
themselves into a web of existing positions in order to carve out their distinctiveness, 
even when breaking with them, but they must also play by the general rules of the 
game, i.e. communal standards for good practice. In some cases, however, new 
                                                        
52 Hedley Bull, ‘International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach,’ World Politics, Vol. 18, No. 
3, 1966, pp. 361–377. 
53
 Tim Dunne, Inventing International Society (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1998), p. 6. Morton Kaplan, 
‘The New Great Debate,’ World Politics, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1966, pp. 1–20 
54 Wæver, ’Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: The Europeanness’, p. 48 and Wæver, ’Aberystwyth, 
Paris, Copenhagen: New ’Schools’’, p. 13. 
55
 Quoted in Wæver, ‘The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline,’ p. 716. 
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schools not only try to carve out an intellectual niche by playing by the rules but also 
attempt to subvert the dominant schools and their standards for good research. 
‘Arising in opposition to the status quo, a new school both introduces innovations 
into the accepted idea system of a discipline or specialty and challenges the authority 
structure of its field’, Olga Amsterdamska contends, stressing that as it strives for 
recognition, a new school may formulate their own intellectual goals, methods and 
criteria of evaluation.
56
 She goes so far as to argue that ‘a school of thought can strive 
to establish an independent right to legitimize scholarly research and thus also to 
bypass or overthrow the existing scholarly elite’ and that ‘in attempting to achieve 
authority, those who proclaim a new school can lay more stress on the distinctiveness 
of their goals, methods, and criteria than intellectual history may determine is 
warranted.’
57
 
If all emerging schools emphasize their distinctiveness vis-à-vis positions in the 
American mainstream—perhaps excessively so in the case of the Chinese School 
according to its critics,
58
 it is not clear that all of them have actively sought to 
fundamentally subvert existing hierarchies and standards for evaluating research in 
the existing IR discipline still dominated by American IR. While the English School’s 
classical approach and historical-sociological methodology and the Copenhagen 
School’s discursive speech-act theory of securitization do diverge from conventional 
American standards of research, the Tsinghua school and this very journal for 
example have sought rather to emulate the standards for high-quality research that 
prevail in the mainstream American discipline.  
 
Opposition-recognition dynamics 
 
                                                        
56 Olga Amsterdamska, ‘Institutions and Schools of Thought,’ American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 91, 
No. 2, 1985, p. 332. 
57
 Amsterdamska, ‘Institutions and Schools of Thought,’ p. 332. 
58
 Yan makes such a critique of Chinese School proponents in Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern 
Chinese Power, yet is himself critiqued for overplaying the exceptionalism and Chineseness while 
ignoring relevant Western scholarship making similar points by, for example, Victoria Tin-Bor Hui, 
‘Building Castles in the Sand,’ Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 425–449. 
See also critics of exceptionalism and the romanticization of Chineseness in Chinese IR theorizing in 
Kim, ‘Will IR Theory with Chinese Characteristics be a Powerful Alternative?’; Gilbert 
Rozman, ’Invocations of Chinese Traditions in International Relations’, Journal of Chinese Political 
Science, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2014, pp. 111–124; Peter Marcus Kristensen and Ras Tind Nielsen, 
‘Constructing a Chinese International Relations Theory,’ International Political Sociology, Vol. 7, No. 
1, 2013, pp. 19–40; Peter Marcus Kristensen and Ras Tind Nielsen, ’”You need to do something that 
the Westerners cannot understand”’, in Nicola Horsburgh, Astrid Nordin, Shaun Breslin (eds.) Chinese 
Politics and International Relations (London: Routledge, 2014). 
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Another factor that contributes to the recognition, and to some extent the formation, 
of new schools is opposition and debate in the field. Most new schools become 
recognized precisely because they become subject to opposition, resistance and 
debate. In that sense, schools or scientific/intellectual movements can be seen as 
‘collective efforts to pursue research programs or projects for thought in the face of 
resistance from others in the scientific or intellectual community.’
59
 The relational 
and (op)positional agency thus also works on behalf of status quo positions. Kuhn 
argued specifically that defenders of the status quo paradigm tend to ferociously resist 
theoretical alternatives rather than, in some Popperian sense, let their own paradigm 
be falsified in the light of factual anomalies.
60
 ‘A new scientific truth does not 
triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light,’ Kuhn cited Max 
Planck approvingly from his autobiography, ‘but rather because its opponents 
eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it.’
61
 Of course, 
schools work at a different level than paradigms, and their less all-encompassing 
nature may allow for coexistence and tolerance, even if they too may be 
incommensurable. Still, resistance to recognition and direct opposition from the status 
quo positions testifies not just to the struggle but also to the very emergence of a new 
school of thought. As an indication of this opposition-recognition dynamic, the labels 
of schools are often given and used by their critics for the purpose of delegitimizing 
its existence and denying it recognition. 
A notable example of opposition-recognition dynamics leading to the 
crystallization and emergence of national schools is the labeling of the ‘Austrian 
School’ of economics by opponents from the ‘German Historical School’ during the 
Methodenstreit. Although the label ‘Austrian’ was a pejorative one as seen from the 
German perspective, the smear ‘boomeranged’ and catapulted the Austrian School to 
fame.
 62
 The most prominent case in IR is perhaps that of the ‘English School’, a label 
coined by Roy Jones to advocate its closure.
63
 It is also a critic who coined the term 
‘Copenhagen School’.
64
 Ole Wæver, a leading proponent of the Copenhagen School, 
                                                        
59
 Scott Frickel and Neil Gross, ‘A General Theory of Scientific/Intellectual Movements,’ American 
Sociological Review, Vol. 70, No. 2, 2005, p. 206. 
60 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 18-19, 77, 150-151. 
61
 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 151. 
62
 Ludwig Von Mises, The Historical Setting of the Austrian School of Economics (New Rochelle: 
Arlington House, 1969), pp. 19–20. 
63 Jones, ‘The English School of International Relations’. 
64
 Bill Mcsweeney, ‘Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School,’ Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1996, pp. 81–93. 
Page 17 of 33
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cjip
The Chinese Journal of International Politics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 18 
in turn, was instrumental in labeling other European schools in critical security 
studies like the ‘Paris’ and ‘Aberystwyth’ Schools.
65
 This name-calling is important 
because when prominent opponents engage a new school in debate, the process of 
name-calling becomes a battle of mutual positioning: ground for opposition for the 
opponents, and an assertion for recognition by proponents. This is often what propels 
new schools to fame. In this dynamic, resistance from dominant positions in the field 
implies recognition of a serious contender and is often more than what most new 
schools can hope for—particularly in the opposition-recognition by the mainstream 
American discipline.  
The opposition-recognition dynamic can be elaborated through Randall Collins’ 
logic of rivalries for securing, and then protecting, the limited slots that exist in the 
attention space of any intellectual field. For Collins, ‘The underlying dynamic [of 
intellectual life] is a struggle over intellectual territory of limited size.’
66
 He views 
attention space as largely a zero-sum game where no one is willing to give up 
territory without a fight. The social structure of the intellectual world, in his words, 
‘allows only a limited number of positions to receive much attention at any one time. 
There are only a small number of slots to be filled, and once they are filled up, there 
are overwhelming pressures against anyone else pressing through to the top ranks.’
67
 
This framing helps understand why the global recognition of the English School as a 
distinctive and systematic approach to theorizing IR—a credible alternative to the 
mainstream IR theories—is only recent. For the English School, the battle of 
opposition-recognition has been a long drawn-out one. It is only after the end of the 
Cold War when large political and economic transformations indirectly set off 
periods of intellectual change that the restructuring of the attention space in the 
intellectual field of IR becomes possible. As the structural opportunities arise for 
reconfiguring the attention space, a group of self-identified English School scholars 
have cultivated diligently these opportunities through intensive intellectual 
maneuvering, securing for the English School one of the limited number of attention 
slots in this reconfigured intellectual territory of limited size of IR.
68
  
                                                        
65  C.A.S.E. Collective, ‘Critical Approaches to Security in Europe'; Wæver, ‘Aberystwyth, Paris, 
Copenhagen: New 'Schools'’.  
66
 Collins, The Sociology of Philosophies, p. 75. 
67
 Collins, The Sociology of Philosophies, p. 75. 
68 Yongjin Zhang, ‘The Global Diffusion of the English School', in Cornelia Navari and Dan Green, 
eds., Guide to the English School in International Studies (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014), pp. 
223–240. 
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If Collins is right and if the English School case is the norm not the exception, 
then opposition-recognition dynamics are likely to play out even more vigorously and 
passionately in the battle for recognition by ‘non-Western’ schools of IR. So far ‘non-
Western’ schools have not been able to muster the same kind of attention and 
recognition in the ‘global’ discipline, even in the form of critique or calls for closure, 
as the European schools mentioned above. The ‘Chinese school’, ‘Korean School’, 
‘Japanese School’ and to an even greater extent the ‘Brasilia School’ are largely self-
proclaimed schools coined and debated by proponents.
69
 To the extent that they have 
actually attracted critique, this is mostly from domestic critics who argue that these 
schools are mostly self-promoted and insular rather than schools coined and engaged 
by outsiders.
70
 Most international writing on these non-Western schools has been part 
of ‘IR around the world’ surveys—that is, making them exotic ‘postcards from’ 
China, India, Korea, etc.—rather than as an integral part of ongoing theoretical 
debates in the discipline, where their ideas are engaged, applied and critiqued.  
This dynamic of ‘dominance by neglect’
71
 is pervasive in the global 
disciplinary landscape. There are a number of sociological explanations for this, but 
one has particular relevance in the context of opposition-recognition dynamics in the 
field. The so-called ‘geographical schools’ are not only subject to opposition-
recognition dynamics in one field, i.e. the American-global core. Opposition-
recognition dynamics also work at the level of regional or national fields, as 
illustrated by the dynamic debate among critical security schools in Europe and 
increasingly sub-schools in China. This is an important insight when it comes to 
understanding the innovation of theoretical approaches from beyond the American 
core of the discipline. Theoretical interventions from beyond the American core, the 
geo-schools as they tend to be called, play a ‘two-level game’ where they navigate 
between relevant (op)positions in the global (read: Anglo-American) and the 
                                                        
69
 Amado Luiz Cervo, ‘Política Exterior e Relações Internacionais do Brasil,’ Revista Brasileira de 
Política Internacional, Vol. 46, No. 2, 2003, pp. 5–25; Qin, ‘A Chinese School of International 
Relations Theory’; Ren Xiao, ‘Toward a Chinese School of International Relations,’ in Wang Gungwu 
and Zheng Yongnian, eds., China and the New International Order (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 
293–309; Ren, ‘The “Chinese School” debate’. 
70 For the Chinese case, see Yan, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power and critics cited in 
Kristensen and Nielsen, ‘Constructing a Chinese International Relations Theory'; For the Brazilian 
case, see Hugo Arend, ‘Brazilian Readings of International Relations,’ Paper for the IPSA-ECPR Joint 
Conference, São Paulo, February 16-19, 2010; and critics cited in Peter Marcus Kristensen, ‘Southern 
Sensibilities,’ Journal of International Relations and Development, 2017, doi:10.1057/s41268-017-
0107-z.  
71
 Waever, ‘Still a Discipline after all These Debates?’, p. 313. 
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domestic field. The Chinese School debate is an illustrative example. It both works 
through global position-taking vis-à-vis Western IR theories and through ‘domestic’ 
position-taking in the debate for and against a Chinese School and later the more 
structured rivalry between the Tsinghua, Guanxi and Tianxia schools.
72
  
What makes the Chinese School debate interesting is exactly that it is clearly a 
debate with different relational position-takings, both domestically as well as 
internationally. The Chinese School debate is different from the conversation on 
theory construction in other ‘non-Western’ or ‘Southern’ contexts precisely because it 
has been subject to domestic debate among China’s top IR scholars, both for and 
against a Chinese School and between sub-schools. In comparison, there are also 
advocates of constructing IR theory from India through recovering Indian cultural-
philosophical resources and by formulating alternative epistemologies. There is 
nevertheless a broad consensus that building an Indian school would be a nativist 
project that should be avoided. While these scholars also lament Eurocentrism and 
Anglo-American dominance in the global discipline, they rarely position themselves 
on the global level as a ‘non-Western’ or even ‘Indian’ theory vis-à-vis Western IR 
theory, as is often the case with Chinese School positioning. Their positioning is 
rather ‘post-Western IR’.
73
 The Indian theory conversation thus plays two different 
(op)position-recognition games. In the Brazilian case, too, there is less domestic 
debate on a nation-wide Brazilian School and the closest is those who advocate a 
Brasilia School. Compared to the Chinese School, however, the ‘Brasilia School’ is 
even more driven by self-promotion, is even more insular, and has not been directly 
put forward as a contender on the global field.
74
  
For theorists from outside the American core, the opposition-recognition 
dynamics are interesting also because for them, the domestic and global fields are 
often not only differentiated territorially—as the inside field versus the outside 
field—but also functionally as the ‘field of production’ and the ‘field of reception’, 
respectively.
75
 The fields of production and reception will of course be identical to 
scholars who produce and speak mostly to a domestic audience, but are not to those 
                                                        
72
 Zhang and Chang, Constructing a Chinese School of International Relations. 
73 See for instance Navnita Behera, ‘Re-Imagining IR in India,’ International Relations of the Asia-
Pacific Vol. 7, 2007, pp. 341–368; Deepshikha Shahi and Gennaro Ascione, ‘Rethinking the absence 
of post-Western International Relations theory in India,' European Journal of International Relations, 
Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 313-334; Kristensen, Rising Powers in the International Relations Discipline. 
74 Kristensen, ’Southern Sensibilities’. 
75
 Bourdieu in Helen Turton, International Relations and American Dominance (London: Routledge, 
2016). 
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aiming to position a ‘domestic product’ in a ‘global field of reception’. In principle, 
the logic of relational position-taking in a domestic field of production and a global 
field of reception also applies to new American theories. But due to the parochialism 
of American IR and its conflation of ‘American’ and ‘Global’ IR, these theoretical 
products will often be put forward only in relation to the dominant positions in the 
American field. As we will discuss further in the final section, this conflation is also 
part of the explanation why American theories are rarely put forward as ‘American’ 
theories. For geographical schools from the periphery, by contrast, even if they are 
successful in gaining recognition in the global field of reception, there are obvious 
pitfalls of having played the two-level game: they will often enter as a representative 
of IR from a particular country or region while the heterogeneity in the field of 
production tends to be downplayed or ignored. The navigation between the global and 
domestic field also explains why naming remains such a contentious issue for the 
Chinese School. The generic ‘Chinese School’ label has certain advantages in a 
global field of reception where a rising China is gaining ever more attention. Yet the 
domestic discourse has clearly shifted in recent years from the pursuit of a singular 
‘Chinese School’ toward a more structured rivalry among the Tsinghua, Tianxia and 
Guanxi/relationality schools, or indeed parallel theoretical innovations in developing 
relational constructivism, social evolutionism and moral realism, among others.
 76
 
A final reason why non-Western geographical schools have not yet gained 
much opposition and/or recognition in the global discipline may have to do with the 
fact that these schools are still in their intellectual infancy and have not yet a 
significant contribution to knowledge production, not to speak of carving out a 
distinct position that warrants recognition. Moreover, they remain relatively closed 
intellectual and social networks, not as connected as they could, and should, be to the 
social and intellectual networks of the dominant Euro-American discipline, its 
journals, book presses, associations, conferences, awards and general symbolic 
infrastructure.  
 
                                                        
76 L.H.M. Ling, ‘What’s in a name? A critical interrogation of the “Chinese School of IR”,’ in Zhang 
and Chang, eds., Constructing a Chinese School of International Relations, pp. 17–34; and Yongjin 
Zhang, 'Constructing a Chinese School of IR as a Sociological reality', in Zhang and Chang, eds., 
Constructing a Chinese School of International Relations, pp. 192-209; Ren, ‘The “Chinese School” 
Debate’; Yan, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power; Yan, ‘An International Relations 
Theory of Moral Realism’; Li Changwen, ‘Critical Thinking on Three Paradigms of International 
Relations Theories, Journal of Jiangnan Social University, 2, 2017, pp. 49-54. 
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Social and intellectual networks 
 
Distinctively positioned ideas that are subject to debate and opposition/recognition 
dynamics do not, in themselves, make a school. Schools are social and intellectual 
collectives. Genuine schools of thought, Joseph Schumpeter asserted, ‘are 
sociological realities. They have their structures—relations between leaders and 
followers—their flags, their battle cries, their moods, and their all-too human 
interests.’
77
 A school of thought is defined by social and intellectual networks in so 
far as it is ‘a socially constructed and informal community of researchers who build 
on each other’s ideas and share similar interests [and a label] for dense social 
networks that distribute information through personal ties, conferences, conversations, 
etc.’
78
 
This network conception of schools of thought implies some degree of 
exclusivity. Social and intellectual network formation indeed usually start out as 
exclusive clubs with restricted membership and continue to have one or a few 
canonical figures. This is clearly the case with the British Committee on the Theory 
of International Politics, which laid the foundation for the emergence of the English 
School.
79
 When Roy Jones coined the term the ‘English School’, it was to refer to a 
body of publications on the question of order in world politics written by a group of 
thinkers closely associated with the British Committee on the Theory of International 
Politics such as Manning, Wight, and Bull, as well as those by Donelan, Northedge 
and Purnell, among others.
80
 Similarly, Bill McSweeney coined the term the 
‘Copenhagen School’ to refer to ‘several publications on the security theme’ 
produced by Barry Buzan and collaborators at the Copenhagen Peace Research 
Institute—an initially quite small network.
81
 None of these two schools have 
remained small exclusive networks, however. It is in large part their ability to be 
inclusive that has allowed them to be propagated over time and space.  
Concerning their propagation over time, followership is an important dimension 
of school formation. ‘Schools of thought’, as sociological realities, must attract 
                                                        
77 Joseph Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (Londong: Routledge, 2006), p. 783. 
78
 Upham, Rosenkopf, and Ungar, ‘Positioning knowledge,’ p. 556. 
79
 Brunello Vigezzi, ‘The British Committee and International Society,’ in Cornelia Navari and Dan 
Green, eds., Guide to the English School in International Studies (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014), 
p. 37. 
80
 Jones, ‘The English School of International Relations,’ p. 1. 
81
 Mcsweeney, ‘Identity and Security,’ p. 81. 
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followers and disciples (think school like a school of fish) and turn into collective 
intellectual movements with their own battle cries and distinctive identity. Randall 
Collins emphasizes not only horizontal but also vertical (teacher-student) personal 
relationships as an important network characteristic of schools of thought.
82
 Indeed, 
one can often find very direct personal ties between successive generations of 
teachers and students, or “young recruits”, as have also been noted in the case the 
English School (e.g. Wight-Bull-Vincent).
83
 The social structure of such relations 
between leaders and followers of a school, however, should not be understood in the 
narrow sense of a group of scholars dogmatically representing a specific line of 
thought or following a distinctive and systematic approach to research in IR with a 
well-established signature method that all adherents agree to take. It is also important 
to emphasize that training is only one way of gaining followers and expanding the 
temporal and spatial reach of a school of thought.  
Schools of thought are constituted not only of horizontal networks among a 
club-like elite and vertical networks between leader and followers, but potentially 
also of broader social and intellectual networks in the field. As Randall Collins argues, 
it is within such networks that scholars engage in interaction rituals at conferences, 
workshops and other types of academic debate and exchange.
84
 These expanding 
networks allow schools to be spatially propagated and to travel beyond their origins. 
It is through these more expansive intellectual networks that a scholar can make the 
best use of his/her knowledge to win broader recognition and attention in the field 
and to form the so-called ‘coalitions in the mind.’ Indeed, the construction of global 
social and intellectual networks is a large part of the explanation why these schools 
become widely recognized as ‘schools’ in the first place. The reconvened English 
School in the twenty-first century, for instance, has evolved into distinctive global 
and regional intellectual networks.
85
  
One does not have to be ‘schooled’ by the originators and enter into the 
school’s mentor-student lineages to be included, but one does have to (self)-identify 
with it and at least be familiar with, even if critical of, its origins and traditions. The 
English School is successful in its global diffusion precisely because of its 
constitution as ‘a heterogeneous community of scholars from a variety of countries 
                                                        
82
 Collins, The Sociology of Philosophies, p. 64-65. 
83 Dunne, Inventing International Society, p. 6. 
84
 Collins, The Sociology of Philosophies, p. 19. 
85
 Zhang, ‘The Global Diffusion of the English School’. 
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who proudly identify themselves with this school’.
86
 As famously conceptualized by 
Martin Wight, the English School can be seen as ‘a great conversation’ open to 
anyone who is interested in the idea of international society as a central 
problematique in understanding international relations.
87
 The English School in its 
current incarnation therefore resembles more of a ‘coalitions in the mind’ as it claims 
a heterogeneous group of scholars ranging from post-structuralist James Der Derian 
to critical theorist Andrew Linklater, and to socio-anthropologist Iver Neumann, and 
to a reformed structural realist Barry Buzan, among others.  
The Copenhagen School, too, has also spurred an immense amount of research 
on ‘securitization’ both in Copenhagen, Europe and beyond, so much so that it has 
arguably transformed from school into a ‘securitization theory’. Part of the success of 
both schools thus also lies in the fact that they are expandable networks whose ideas 
are able to travel, so that a South African or a Chinese can be working with/within the 
English or the Copenhagen School. Other aspiring national schools today—whether 
Brazilian, Chinese, Indian, Korean or Japanese—will invariably have to balance 
exclusivity and distinctiveness with some degree of openness as a social and 
intellectual network. Purely nativist schools of thought with limited social and 
intellectual networks—e.g. a Chinese School by and for the Chinese people—will 
find it harder to get recognized as a genuine school of thought.  
In one sense, the Chinese School of IR can also be characterized as a broader 
conversation or ‘coalition in the mind’ based on the shared belief in the possibility 
and desirability of constructing a Chinese School of IR and firm commitment to and 
strong interests in its construction. Rather than one homogenous school of thought, it 
is a conversation about how to theorize a distinct perspective on world politics that 
draws on Chinese cultural resources and is informed by a historically contingent 
situation of China’s rise to a global power status. And once we zoom in on the geo-
epistemic lens, the putative Chinese School is marked by profound disagreements 
among its advocates as to the agenda, the methodology, and the focus of its empirical 
research for the Chinese School project, and its possible theoretical contribution to 
                                                        
86  Emanuel Adler, 'Barry Buzan’s Use of Constructivism to Reconstruct the English School,’ 
Millennium, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2005, p. 171; Dunne, Inventing International Society. 
87
  Wang and Buzan, ‘The English and Chinese Schools of International Relations,’ p. 10. 
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knowledge production.
88
 However, the Chinese School still has to prove its ability to 
travel over time and space. 
 
Institutional infrastructure 
 
The final, and most literal, definition of a ‘school of thought’ refers to organizations 
where teaching and learning takes place.
89
 The institutional context is more important 
because the dynamics of school formation outlined above can be reinforced by 
support from an institutional and material base, especially the more autonomous 
control the school wields over this base.
90
 There is a sociologically important point in 
emphasizing control over infrastructure because it enables schools to determine their 
own criteria for entry, quality and excellence and thus obtain a certain degree of 
intellectual autonomy, credibility and legitimacy. Moreover, control over institutional 
infrastructure, say a journal, can serve to cultivate and/or promote a discourse and 
debate (i.e. opposition-recognition dynamics) and help diffuse the school and its ideas 
beyond its immediate base (i.e. network expansion).  
As for legitimation and autonomy, new schools are subject to the dynamics of a 
‘dual legitimation system’ as alluded to above.
91
 On the one hand, they attempt to 
achieve recognition from the scientific establishment. On the other, they also aim to 
establish their own means of legitimation by gaining control over their own 
institutions, hiring, training, and publishing according to their own criteria for 
validation. Amsterdamska identified this ‘seemingly contradictory strategy’ that 
‘appears to be characteristic of schools of thought in general’ in the following words  
 
[I]nsofar as access to valued resources in science is dependent on the 
recognition of the value of scholarly contributions, schools must strive for 
external legitimation of their research; insofar as their aim is to assert 
                                                        
88 Kristensen and Nielsen, ‘Constructing a Chinese International Relations Theory’; and Zhang and 
Chang, Constructing a Chinese School of International Relations. For most recent debates in China 
about the prospect of a Chinese School of IR, see Guo Shuyong, ‘The Growth of the Chinese 
Consciousness in the Development of Chinese International Theory and the Prospect of a Chinese 
School of IR’, International Review, 1: 2017, pp. 19-39; Lu Linyu, ‘Constructing a Chinese School of 
International Relations Theory’, Chinese Journal of European Studies, 5, 2016, pp. 129-145; and 
Meng Honghua, ‘From Chinese Characteristics to a Chinese School’’, International Review, 2, 2016, 
pp. 1-13.   
89 Collins, The Sociology of Philosophies, pp. 64-65. 
90
 Collins, The Sociology of Philosophies. 
91
 Amsterdamska, ‘Institutions and Schools of Thought,’ pp. 340–341. 
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independent scientific authority, they attempt to create separate means for the 
legitimation of scientific work.
92
  
 
It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that several schools of thought are often 
centered on and named after institutions—that is, places for instruction and learned 
conversation: Think of the Institut für Sozialforschung at Goethe-Universität 
Frankfurt for the ‘Frankfurt School’ of critical theory, Cambridge University for the 
‘Cambridge School’ of Intellectual History, Kyoto University for the ‘Kyoto School’ 
in philosophy, the University of Chicago for the ‘Chicago Schools’ (in economics and 
sociology) or the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute for the ‘Copenhagen School’ 
in IR and the Institute for International Studies at the Tsinghua University for the 
‘Tsinghua Approach/School’. The institutional level of analysis is probably the most 
common across different fields, compared to national or regional schools, which 
contain more diversity within and also tend to be less institutionally anchored. 
Institutionalized schools can attract a steady inflow of students and a lineage of 
teacher/mentor-student relations that allows the school to be propagated through 
socialization. The institutional infrastructure is furthermore important because it 
allows for control over material and organizational (employment and promotion) as 
well as symbolic resources (prestige and recognition). Institutionalization thus lends 
autonomy and allows schools to determine their own criteria for entry, quality and 
excellence. Given the relatively high degree of strategic dependence in IR on the 
limited access to and control of necessary means of intellectual distribution, 
particularly through highly reputable journals,
93
 this autonomy is, not surprisingly, 
often supported by control over a journal outlet, particularly at a time when journal 
publication not only confers symbolic but also material capital. Prominent cases 
include the ‘Chicago School’ and the American Journal of Sociology and the 
‘Frankfurt School’ and the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung.
94
 In the case of Chinese IR, 
the Institute for International Studies of Tsinghua University publishes both 
Quarterly Journal of International Politics (in Chinese) and the Chinese Journal of 
International Politics (in English). The latter was established in large part to create an 
                                                        
92
 Amsterdamska, ‘Institutions and Schools of Thought,’ p. 341. 
93
 Wæver, ’Still a Discipline after all These Debates?’, pp. 314-315. 
94 Andrew Abbott, Department and Discipline (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999); Martin Jay, 
The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 
1923-1950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), p. 114. 
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(Anglophone) space for Chinese international thought, theorizing the rise of China, 
Chinese culture and philosophy and it has proved instrumental in bringing the 
Chinese School debates to global attention.
95
 The Revista Brasileira de Politica 
Internactional has been an outlet for the so-called Brasilia School, but is also the 
oldest and arguably most prominent IR journal in Brazil. As schools are rarely 
confined to their institutional base, access to, and preferably control over, a 
communication outlet and an association create a space for intellectual conversation 
and the diffusion of ideas. 
The control over journals does not automatically or necessarily strengthen the 
institutional infrastructure of a school of thought, although such control is enabling 
and empowering in terms of determining one’s own criteria for quality and excellence, 
thus conferring some degree of intellectual autonomy. Intellectual entrepreneurship is 
an important consideration as well. In the case of The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics, one of the most successful outlets for publishing and 
disseminating Chinese thought on International Relations, this seems to be aimed 
more at creating a discursive space for Chinese research on International Relations 
and the International Relations of China rather than introducing new research 
standards for the discipline as a whole. The Journal has followed and sought to 
emulate the standards for high-quality research as defined by the mainstream 
American IR, rather than challenge or problematize them.
96
  
 
School Labeling and Geopolitics of Knowledge 
 
Having outlined a sociological framework for understanding the formation of schools 
of thought, let us return now to the labeling puzzle outlined in the introduction. All 
ideas develop in a specific historical, social and geographical context. If that is 
broadly accepted, why are only some labeled after specific geocultural/geographical 
sites, while others are simply called theories and paradigms? Why are ‘isms’ such as 
liberalism, realism and constructivism not considered part of a wider ‘American 
School’? What does such labeling do and what purposes does it serve? Why do labels 
matter? What is the contentious politics behind the (epi)phenomenon of school 
                                                        
95 Peter Marcus Kristensen, ‘International Relations in China and Europe,’ Pacific Review, Vol. 28, No. 
2, 2015, pp. 161–187. 
96
 Kristensen, ‘International Relations in China and Europe'.  
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labeling? Answers to these questions depend contingently on the perspective from 
which one speaks, the dominant and privileged core or the marginalized and 
underprivileged peripheries of the discipline.    
In the first instance, there is a certain ‘repressive tolerance’ involved in the use 
of geographical and institutional labeling of schools of thought by the ‘core’.
97
 It 
grants recognition of its existence, but not as a theory on par with other (American) 
theories. As already noted, in a broader geopolitical pattern in the sociology of 
‘schools’ in IR, such labels are conferred almost exclusively to international thought 
produced outside the United States. Theoretical knowledge produced in the American 
core is mostly referred to prestigiously as theories and paradigms—regardless of the 
fact that some observers have proposed the notion of an ‘American School’, 
especially in IPE.
98
 Privileging theoretical knowledge produced in the United States 
as ‘untainted’ by its geocultural origins effectively creates parallel but hierarchical 
universes in the disciplinary knowledge production. The labeling of geographical and 
institutional school conveniently relegates them to a different and arguably inferior 
universe of knowledge production and circulation. It becomes an integral part of a 
strategy of ‘dominance by neglect’ by the core as mentioned earlier.  
Second, for sceptics and critics at the core, a repressive use of the school label 
serves the purpose of singularizing and homogenizing ideas. It implies that all 
thought with the given geographical or institutional denominator can be described in 
singular terms. This serves to impose a greater degree of homogeneity within the 
school. Compared with American IR, which presents itself as pluralistic, these 
schools of thought would look hopelessly parochial and provincially monotonous. A 
common defense against the labeling of an American school of IR would typically 
ask ‘What do Kenneth Waltz, Richard Ashley, Cynthia Enloe, and Craig Murphy 
have in common?
99
 Yet, this diversity does not preclude certain geo-epistemic 
characteristics of American IR. Arguably, there is also significant diversity within 
geographically labeled schools of IR. Significant differences between pluralism and 
solidarism in the English School can be in part attributed to different geo-epistemic 
position privileging international society vis-à-vis world society perspectives. There 
                                                        
97 Wæver, ’Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New ’Schools’’, p. 13. 
98
 Daniel Maliniak and Michael Tierney, ‘The American school of IPE,’ Review of International 
Political Economy, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2009, pp. 6–33; Levine and Barder, ‘The Closing of the American 
Mind’. 
99
 Porter cited in Wæver, ‘The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline,’ p. 688. 
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is also significant epistemological and methodological diversity within Chinese IR, as 
illustrated above, even though the notion of singular ‘Chinese School’ seems to 
suggest otherwise. 
Third, for the ‘core’, labeling schools of thought with the geographical and 
institutional prefix is useful in localizing ideas, thus denying their potential for 
developing a universal theory. It is true that a contextualist reading could thus situate 
the Copenhagen school as a response to growing concerns over non-traditional 
security threats from migration to environmental degradation in post-cold war Europe. 
The English School could be situated as a response to Great Britain’s imperial decline 
and the rise of postcolonial politics. Indeed, its ideas on the expansion of international 
society and the standard of ‘civilization’ have been read in such a manner.
100
 Yet, few 
would claim that the Copenhagen or the English School are simply ’schools’ in the 
sense of a class of likeminded people at the same location and the ideas they advance 
have only ‘local’ application. Neither is particularly tied in empirical focus to its own 
geographical context compared to, say, the Chicago School of sociology, which used 
the streets of Chicago as their laboratory.
101
 As we have also argued, both schools 
have travelled beyond their original geographical settings and geocultural sites, and 
have expanded both in membership and empirical applications. Both have boasted 
extensive global social and academic networks. To the extent that both the 
Copenhagen School and the English School have arguably made some inroads into 
the American ‘core’, they are, however, exceptions.  
The use of national labels by the core, such as Ch nese, Indian, and Korean, has 
proved effective so far in localizing those theoretical noises from the peripheries, and 
even in delegitimizing their counter-hegemonic claims against the dominance of the 
American ‘core’. From the perspective characteristic of IR as an American social 
science, geographically labeled ‘national’ schools are invited into the global field 
only as schools that are local, applicable only to their own geographical context, and 
constructed and developed only for their own nation-state and perhaps only by, and 
for the consumption of, their nationals. Not surprisingly, as one Chinese scholar noted 
from his personal experience at an international conference, whereas advocating the 
                                                        
100
 William Callahan, ‘Nationalising International Theory: Race, Class and the English School,’ Global 
Society, Vol. 18, No. 4, 2004, pp. 305–323. 
101
 As Abbott quibbles in his history of the Chicago School of Sociology, it ‘is often about the city and, 
if so, nearly always about Chicago…whether it is counting psychotics in neighbourhoods, reading 
immigrants’ letters to the old country, or watching the languid luxuries of the taxi-dance hall.’ Abbott, 
Department and Discipline, p. 6. 
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construction of a national school of IR, such as the Chinese School as a 
counterbalance to the alleged Eurocentrism in IR is often seen as ‘nationalistic’, 
defending the universalist pretensions of the existing theories can claim to be 
cosmopolitan.
102
 Even a well-intentioned critic of national schools of IR warns that 
‘schools yoked to the nation or even to a regional grouping pose dangers of their own. 
One suspects there is another great debate in the making, and perhaps this time 
around it will help to clear the air.’
103
 
 Clearly, school labeling affects how such theorizing efforts from the peripheries 
and semi-peripheries are invited into the conversation in the heartland of the 
discipline, i.e. their positionality in a globalized American social science. School 
labelling in this understanding has helped reinforce and reclaim the centrality of 
mainstream IR theories and the universality claims of the American ‘core’, as well as 
marginalize, if not totally discredit or delegitimize, alternative approaches as 
inherently locally bounded, though not decidedly parochial and flawed. If this is 
indeed the case, why should the school labeling have been willingly appropriated by 
their proponents at the disciplinary peripheries, particularly in the non-Western IR 
epistemic communities? What particular strategic purposes has school labeling served 
in promoting theoretical innovation beyond the West? We argue that school labeling 
has been actively appropriated by its proponents when designating emerging 
geographically labeled national schools of IR beyond the West for three strategic and 
political reasons.  
First, geographical school making at the peripheries carries special political 
significance and it is purposely contentious. It is true that for some, particular those 
advocating national schools, this is meant to assert a particular national identity 
through producing alternative theories. But for others, waving the flags of national 
schools of IR beyond the West is not only aimed at alternative knowledge production. 
Rather, it is also a purposeful political contention,
104
 as many feminist, post-colonial 
and green battle cries have been. It is to make a political point to disturb the status 
quo, to articulate a protest over the prevailing disciplinary fashion, and to engage in a 
kind of academic insurrection, or ‘epistemic disobedience’ in the words of Walter 
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103
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Page 30 of 33
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cjip
The Chinese Journal of International Politics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 31 
Mignolo,
105
 against theoretical and intellectual hegemony of either its Eurocentrism 
reincarnation or an American social science manifestation.  
Second, the appropriation of geographical school labels by those at the 
peripheries can be read as a strategic way to decenter and provincialize, perhaps even 
nationalize, American IR and expose the self-serving interests of its pretentiously 
universalist epistemology. In asserting their legitimacy, emerging non-Western 
schools have often claimed to be counter-hegemonic, in particular against the 
dominance of American IR as an intricately differentiated structure of authorities that 
privileges a singular site for knowledge production with a particular conception of 
what is credible and legitimate knowledge. Looking through geo-cultural lenses, 
challenging the universalist claims of American IR theories through theoretical 
innovation by non-Western IR schools is to assert knowledge claims from the 
putative peripheries and semi-peripheries of the discipline in its existing geography of 
knowledge. It not only attempts to break down the prejudices embedded in the 
existing knowledge system, but also question the claim of the American ‘core’ as the 
creator, depositor and distributor of universal knowledge. Moreover, as a strategic, or 
‘cynical’ in Bourdieusian terms, move, it deploys an otherwise marginalized 
periphery habitus as a potentially ‘subversive capital’.
106
 
Third, geographical school making becomes an articulation of ‘an epistemic 
awakening’. In highlighting the global power differential in the geopolitics of 
knowledge-making, it unveils the geo-historical linkage between the political and the 
epistemic. It lays bare the nature of the ‘epistemic violence’
107
 historically committed 
by Eurocentrism ‘understood as a way of conceiving of and organizing 
knowledge’,
108
 which continues to obstruct and undermine ‘Southern’ or ‘non-
Western’ approaches to knowledge. Against this backdrop, non-Western school 
labeling and -making constitutes an intervention into the uneven geo-political 
structures of IR, as it calls into question the modern and colonial foundation of the 
control of knowledge while also creating an opening for alternative sources and 
modes of knowing. As a proponent of Indian theorizing puts it in an interview, ‘We 
                                                        
105 Walter Mignolo, ‘Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and De-Colonial Freedom’, 
Theory, Culture & Society, Vol. 26 (7–8), 2009, pp. 1–23.  
106
 Hamati-Ataya, ’IR Theory as International Practice/Agency’, p. 643. 
107
 Gayatri Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’, in Rosalind Morris (ed.), Can the Subaltern Speak? 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2010 [1988]). 
108
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just want to say that we can think. It’s as simple as that.’
109
 School labeling is 
political, as it is integral of a collective action to redress epistemic injustice, which 
contributes to the oppression of those at the margins and their claims as knowers.
110
 
From a sociology of knowledge stance, it is important to stress that this is primarily a 
move in disciplinary politics, not necessarily a product of great power politics as the 
most externalist accounts, and many critics of new schools, would have it. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Schools of thought in IR as self-conscious, intellectually distinct, socially recognized 
and institutionalized collective endeavors at knowledge production are clearly an 
integral part of the disciplinary growth of IR. It has become increasingly part of the 
historiography of IR. Following the tradition of sociology of IR pioneered by Carr, 
we set out to explore how geo-epistemic diversity has informed (or not) our 
understanding of the sociologically problematic nature of IR knowledge production in 
the existing discipline. The categorization of collective endeavors of non-American 
theoretical knowledge production as ‘schools’ and the use of geographical and 
institutional labels to name them, we have argued, help solidify the core and 
periphery configuration in the discipline of IR. Using the insights generated by the 
sociology of science and of philosophies, we have identified four clusters of 
sociological conditions and dynamics that facilitate the formation and sustain the 
operation of schools of thought in IR. In exemplify ng how these dynamics are 
operationalized in the instance of the formation and operation of the English School, 
the Copenhagen School and the Chinese School, however, it becomes abundantly 
clear that not far behind the epistemic is the political and that the sociological and the 
political are inseparable. Where knowledge is produced often determines whether it is 
accepted as genuine contribution to knowledge with what degree of 
universality/particularity and thus how it is accepted, ordered, disseminated and 
consumed in the discipline. School labeling in this sense is more than an 
epiphenomenon. It constitutes a battleground for contestation and legitimation. While 
the ‘core’ uses the school label to create a parallel, and explicitly inferior, universe of 
knowledge production to localize theoretical noises from the peripheries, the school 
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label is proactively appropriated by those at peripheries and semi-peripheries to assert 
their knowledge claims, to legitimate their theoretical enterprises and to provincialize 
American IR. For non-Western national schools of IR, the appropriation of the school 
label can also be seen as a call for ‘epistemic justice’ in terms of removing the 
colonial and imperial epistemological foundation of the knowledge control in the first 
instance. To the extent that the curious case of schools of IR embodies a harrowing 
struggle for IR to become a truly global discipline, it demands more attention from 
the discipline and entails more in-depth research to better understand the persistence 
of geopolitics of knowledge and its perils in our collective pursuit of constructing a 
truly global IR.  
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